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French Public Attitudes towards the Prospect of War in 1938-39: 
¶3DFLILVP·RU¶:DU$Q[LHW\·" 
 
DANIEL HUCKER 
 
Abstract: This article challenges the received wisdom that French public 
opinion was infused with pacifist sentiment during the 1930s, and that this 
sentiment in turn contributed to the French defeat of 1940. It will suggest 
that French public attitudes towards the prospect of war can be better 
GHILQHGDV¶ZDUDQ[LHW\·UDWKHUWKDQWKHYDOXH-ODGHQWHUP¶SDFLILVW·7DNLQJDV
a test case the period between the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and 
the outbreak of the Second World War less than a year later, the article will 
WHDVHRXWWKHQHFHVVDU\GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ¶SDFLILVP·DQG¶ZDUDQ[LHW\·%\
HPSOR\LQJDQRWLRQRI¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV·RISXEOLFRSLQLRQLWZLOOEHVKRZQ
how French opinion was demonstrably less pacifist than many existing 
analyses assume. Instead, it ZLOOEHFRQWHQGHGWKDWWKHSXEOLF·VDQ[LHWLHV
with regard to a future war manifested themselves in a variety of ways, of 
ZKLFKSDFLILVPZDVPHUHO\RQHPDUJLQDOH[DPSOH,QGHHG¶ZDUDQ[LHW\·
increasingly demanded that France prepare for an inevitable conflict, in stark 
contrast to simply retreating into a defeatist mindset and thus establishing 
the conditions for the defeat in 1940. 
 
 
Pacifism is widely regarded to have been a defining characteristic of public 
attitudes towards the prospect of war in interwar France.1 French foreign 
                                                 
1 Pacifism was evoked, either explicitly or implicitly, in several of the earliest autopsies of 
the French defeat of 1940, including A. Werth, The Twilight of France, 1933-1940, (New 
York, 1966 [1942]), C. Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939: A Study of 
Public Opinion, (New York, 1964 [1943]) and M. Bloch, /·pWUDQJHGpIDLWe: témoignage écrit en 
1940, (Paris, 1946). It has consistently been alluded to in the subsequent historiography, 
notably L. Mysyrowicz, $XWRSVLHG·XQHGpIDLWHRULJLQHVGHO·HIIRQGUHPHQWPLOLWDLUHIUDQoDLVGH
1940, (Lausanne, 1973), J.-B. Duroselle, La décadence, 1932-1939, (Paris, 1979), J.-P. 
Azéma, De Munich à la libération, 1938-1944, (Paris, 2002 [1979]), E. Weber, The hollow 
years: France in the 1930s, (New York, 1996), and J. Jackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi 
Invasion of 1940, (Oxford, 2003). Analyses focusing on French opinion also emphasize the 
prevalence of pacifism, including J.-L. Crémieux-Brilhac /HV)UDQoDLVGHO·DQ, 2 vols, 
(Paris, 1990), P. Laborie, /·RSLQLRQIUDQoDLVHVRXV9LFK\, (Paris, 1990) and Y. Lacaze, 
/·RSLQLRQSXEOLTXHIUDQoDise et la crise de Munich, (Bern, 1991). Several works focus on 
pacifism itself, notable N. Ingram, The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France, 1919-1939, 
(Oxford, 1991), F.-*'UH\IXV¶/HSDFLILVPHHQ)UDQFH-·LQ09DwVVHHG Le 
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policy-makers, it is argued, were constrained by a profoundly pacifist 
French populace, desperate to avoid war. This article, however, will argue 
WKDWWKHWHUP¶SDFLILVP·KDVEHHQWRREURDGO\DSSOLHGWRLQWHUZDU)UHQFK
public opinion and thus fails to explain sufficiently public attitudes to war. 
Specifically, the negative connotations of pacifism ² namely fear of war, 
unwillingness to fight, defeatism, and even collaborationism ² were less  
widespread in 1930s France than the notion of a pacifist-infused masses 
LPSOLHV,QLWVSODFHDEURDGHUFRQFHSWRI¶ZDUDQ[LHW\·ZLOOEHGHYHORSHG
/HVVULJLGWKDQ¶SDFLILVP·¶ZDUDQ[LHW\·LVPRUHDSSOLFDEOHWRVHFWLRQVRI
)UHQFKRSLQLRQWKDWIHDUHGZDUEXWZHUHQRW¶SDFLILVW·LQWKHGRFWULQal sense 
RIWHUP¶:DUDQ[LHW\·LQFRUSRUDWHVQRWRQO\¶SDFLILVW·WHQGHQFLHVRIRSLQLRQ
but also those less easily identifiable, politicized or voluble tendencies 
regarding the prospect of war. A concept of war anxiety is beneficial as it 
encompasses a diverse range of sentiments and opinions, and thus better 
reflects the nuances of French opinion.2  
Essentially, they are two defining characteristics of war anxiety: 
firstly, it was inspired by the prevailing sentiment that the Great War must 
never be repeated; secondly, it was founded upon an acute unease regarding 
WKHSRWHQWLDOUHSHUFXVVLRQVRIDQRWKHUFRQIOLFW,QGHHGLWWKHWHUP¶QH[WZDU
DQ[LHW\·LVDUJXDEO\PRUHDFFXUDWHUHIOHFWLQJWKHFRQFHUQWKDWWHFKQRORJLFDO
advancements since 1914-18, particularly in terms of air power, meant that 
the next war would be more destructive than the last. This article will 
                                                                                                                                                        
pacifisme en Europe des années 1920 aux années 1950, (Brussels, 1993) and J.-P. Biondi, 
La mêlée des pacifistes, 1914-1945, (Paris, 2000). Finally, a number of works discuss 
pacifism within certain sections of French society, such as war veterans (A. Prost, Les 
anciens combattants et la société français, 3 vols, (Paris, 1977), esp. vol. 3, mentalités et 
idéologies,), intellectuals (J.-F. Sirinelli, Génération intellectuelle: Khâgneux et Normaliens 
GDQVO·HQWUH-deux-guerres, (Paris, 1994 [1988])), the role of women in the pacifist movement 
(S. Reynolds, France between the Wars: Gender and Politics, (London, 1996)), and 
schoolteachers (M. Siegel, The Moral Disarmament of France: Education, Patriotism and 
Pacifism, 1914-1940, (Cambridge, 2004)). Pacifism within the French peasantry has also 
EHHQH[SORUHG,%RXVVDUG¶/HSDFLILVPHSD\VDQ·LQ55pPRQGDQG-%RXUGLQHGVLa 
France et les Français, 1938-1939,(Paris, 1978), pp. 59-75, as has the impact of pacifist 
VHQWLPHQWDPRQJVW)UHQFKVRFLDOLVWV5*RPELQ¶6RFLDOLVPHHWSDFLILVPH·LQLa France et 
les Français, pp. 245-260 and M. Bilis, Socialistes et pacifists, 1933-RXO·LQWHQDEOH
dilemma des socialistes français, (Paris, 1979)). 
2 Norman Ingram has noted the semantic debate on the use of the term, with the French 
concept of pacifism being more all-encompassing than the Anglo-Saxon usage, which tends 
to be more value-ODGHQ1,QJUDP¶5HSUHVVHG0HPRU\6\QGURPH,QWHUZDU)UHQFK3DFLILVP
DQGWKH$WWHPSWWR5HFRYHU)UDQFH·V3DFLILVW3DVW·French History, 18 (2004), p. 316. 
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examine war anxiety in the period between the Munich Agreement in 
September 1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War less than a year 
later. This period is crucial as it is widely argued that Munich marked the 
zenith of French pacifism, an argument that initially took hold in the early 
\HDUVRIWKHZDU,Q/RXLV/pY\ZURWHKRZ¶$WWKHWLPHRI0XQLFKDOO
the hidden pacifism that had lain in the hearts of some of the working-class 
OHDGHUVFDPHWRWKHVXUIDFH·3 6LPLODUO\WKHDSSDUHQW¶KDUGHQLQJ·RISXEOLF
opinion after Munich is often equated with a diminution of pacifist 
sentiment.4  
However, although doctrinal pacifism certainly lost ground after 
Munich, it would be misleading to assume that all anxieties regarding a 
future conflict had vanished. War anxiety remained, only now it dictated 
that French policymakers adopt a firmer posture, deterring the dictators 
whilst simultaneously preparing France for war. Consequently, although 
war anxiety was still a constraint, it did not induce the defeatism so often 
associated with pacifism. By 1939, perceptions of public opinion held by the 
policymaking elites no longer compelled them to avoid a policy of firmness 
against the dictators. On the contrary, war anxiety demanded a concerted 
effort to prepare the nation for an impending conflict.  
 
I 
 
In order to analyse public attitudes towards the prospect of war, it is 
essential to both develop a methodological framework with which to 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHWURXEOHVRPHFRQFHSWRISXEOLFRSLQLRQ(YLGHQWO\¶SXEOLF
RSLQLRQ·FDQHPDQDWHIURPDGLYHUVHDUUD\RIJURXSVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQV
throughout society. Nevertheless, approaching the question via a notion of 
representations can reveal how certain tendencies of opinion assumed a 
                                                 
3 L. Lévy, TheTtruth about France, translated by W. Pickles, (London, 1941), p. 119. This 
interpretation remains prominent, particularly the assumption that Munich was the 
¶DSRJHH·RISDFLILVPSee J.-P. Azéma, De Munich à la liberation, pp. 12-22. See also J. 
Jackson, The Fall of France, pp. 147-149, for a similar viewpoint. 
4 Indeed, it is commonly argued that the decline of pacifism began in the mid-1930s. A. 
$GDPWKZDLWHIRUH[DPSOHVXJJHVWVWKDW¶SDFLILVPZDQHGDIWHU·Grandeur and Misery: 
)UDQFH·V%LGIRU3RZHULQ(XURSH-1940, (New York, 1995), p. 169. 
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dominant position, not only transcending and marginalizing others, but 
often concealing them altogether.5 To an extent, such a methodology 
borrows from Pierre Laborie, who suggests that using representation as an 
historical tool enables one to identify, within the multifarious expressions of 
RSLQLRQKRZVSHFLILFGRPLQDQWWHQGHQFLHVHPHUJHDURXQGZKLFK¶D
FRPPRQQRWLRQRIRSLQLRQ·FDQEHLGHQWLILHG7KLVVKDUHGSHUFHSWLRQRI
opinion allows the KLVWRULDQWR¶GHILQHWKHKLVWRULFDOVWDWXVRIWKH
SKHQRPHQDRIRSLQLRQDQGLWVSODFHLQWKHH[SODQDWRU\SURFHVVHV·6 
Identifying dominant tendencies of opinion through the prism of 
representations enables a more sophisticated analytical framework to 
emerge, illustrating how the intangible phenomena of opinion was reduced 
to a more manageable series of dominant representations. 
This article will consider two distinct categories of representation 
through which French public opinion in the late 1930s was perceived by the 
decision-PDNLQJHOLWHV)LUVWO\¶UHDFWLYH·UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIRSLQLRQWKDWLV
the immediate and spontaneous reactions of the public to 
circumstances/events as they occur. These forms of representation can 
include the contemporary press, recent police reports on the state of 
opinion, election results, an analysis of political leaflets, posters and 
pamphlets in current circulation, and the conversations, gossip, 
correspondence and rumours within social networks of friends, family and 
colleagues. This category of representations therefore reflects how public 
opinion is fluid, constantly in transition, fluctuating and diverse. Secondly, 
WKHUHDUHFHUWDLQ¶UHVLGXDO·UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVZKLFKFDQEHGHILQHGDVWKH
remnants of previous memories and experiences, the more general 
tendencies of opinion considered characteristic of previous years, even 
previous decades. These lack the specificity of the contemporary, reactive 
                                                 
5 The study of representations has been pioneered largely within the disciplines of sociology 
and psychology. For a good introduction to these theoretical approaches, see S. Moscovici, 
¶7KHSKHQRPHQRQRIVRFLDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV·LQ60RVFRYLFLHGSocial Representations: 
Explorations in Social Psychology, (Cambridge, 2000 [1981]), and 5 6+DOO¶7KH:RUNRI
5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ·LQ6+DOOHGRepresentation: Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practices, (London, 1997). 
6 P. Laborie, Les Français des années troubles, (Paris, 2003), p. 38. 
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representations, but nonetheless retained sufficient power to be habitually 
projected onto perceptions of current opinion. 
It is within this category of representation that pacifism was 
prominent. Such was the pervasiveness of the idea that French society had 
assumed a pacifist tinge following the carnage and horror of the Great War 
thDWLWIRUPHGDSRWHQW¶UHVLGXDO·UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRISXEOLFRSLQLRQ
persuading the policymaking elites that French opinion remained pacifist 
throughout the interwar years. It was thus difficult to conceive that the 
majority of the people would, just twenty years later, have abandoned this 
sentiment to the extent that they would favour resistance to appeasement. 
This article will suggest that residual representations of opinion can be 
overemphasized, interpreted in such a way as to distort reality by means of 
a dominant and vocal minority providing formative representations that are 
subsequently projected onto the wider corpus of opinion. As Jean-Noël 
-HDQQHQH\DVVHUWV¶WKHLQWHQVHRSLQLRQRIDQDFWLYHPLQRULW\RIWHQH[HUWV
more pressure on proceedings than the half-hearted reactions of an 
LQGLIIHUHQWPDMRULW\·7 Moreover, such a residual representation can become 
so pervasive that it retains a potentially unrepresentative influence, 
stubbornly refusing to yield to the changes and fluctuations of opinion(s) in 
response to the progression of time and events. Indeed, they become, to 
ERUURZIURP-DPHV-ROO¶XQVSRNHQDVVXPSWLRQV·8   
 In interwar France, pacifism was a peculiarly pervasive 
representation of public opinion. It is widely held that French opinion was, if 
not pacifist, certainly infused with an anxiety regarding the prospect of war. 
However, clearly differentiating between pacifism and a more widespread 
DQ[LHW\UHJDUGLQJWKH¶QH[W·ZDUIDFLOLWDWHVDPRUHDFFXUDWHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
WKHSXEOLF·VDSSUHKHQVions regarding the prospect of war. Of particular 
interest here is the prospect of aerial bombardment, and how technological 
advancements since the Great War meant that any future conflict would be 
                                                 
7 J.-N. Jeanneney, Une histoire des médias, (Paris), p. 16. 
8 J. Joll, 1914: The Unspoken Assumptions, an inaugural lecture delivered 25 April 1968 at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, (London, 1968). See also, Z. Steiner, 
¶(OLWLVPDQG)RUHLJQ3ROLF\7KH)RUHLJQ2IILFHEHIRUHWKH*UHDW:DU·LQ%-&0F.HUFKHU
and D. J. Moss (eds.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939: Memorial 
Essays Honouring C. J. Lowe, (Edmonton, 1984), pp. 19-55. 
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HYHQPRUHGHYDVWDWLQJ5REHUW<RXQJKDVQRWHGWKDW¶OLWHUDture on the 
subject of air war rarely use[d] Berlin as a figurative example of an air 
target. Rather, the French used Tours, or Dijon, or Reims, or, especially, 
3DULV·9 6LPLODUO\5REHUW3D[WRQQRWHVWKDW¶:DUPHDQWSRLVRQJDVDQGWKH
bombing of cities. 3DULVZRXOGEHZRUVHWKDQ*XHUQLFD·10  
 However, such fears are better characterized as manifestations of 
war anxiety rather than pacifism. In contradistinction from pacifism, war 
anxiety was neither an explicit fear of war nor a deeply-held conviction that 
war was unjustifiable. Similarly it would not automatically manifest itself as 
defeatism in the event of war. This distinction between pacifism and war-
anxiety ² RUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\DQ[LHW\DVUHJDUGVWKH¶QH[WZDU·² is one that 
needs to be made. It is rather crude simply to label the desire for peace as 
pacifism (in all its guises, ideological, doctrinal, religious etc.). Therefore, it 
is reasonable to suggest that as war became increasingly likely, the 
distinction between pacifism and a more intangible ¶DQ[LHW\·RUHYHQ¶IHDU·RI
war became more conspicuous. Such an anxiety was arguably far more 
widespread than pacifism, in the stricter definition of the term. Moreover, it 
was shared by the public and policymaking elites alike. 
Therefore, during the period 1938-9, the marginalization of doctrinal 
pacifism ensured that the residual representation of widespread French 
pacifism was gradually superseded. This did not, however, occur rapidly, as 
the idea of a pacifist French society was particularly entrenched. During the 
preceding years, pacifist doctrine had been espoused by numerous pacifist 
organizations, politicians and within the popular press. Consequently, the 
sentiments of a vocal minority were perceived to be a mirror of mainstream 
opinion. This is, of course, unsurprising, as the aftermath of the First World 
War provided a perfect environment in which pacifism could flourish, 
nurturing a deep-rooted conviction that it never be repeated. The pre-war 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIZDUDVSDWULRWLFRI¶Mourir pour ODSDWULHF·HVWOHVRUWOH
                                                 
9 5<RXQJ¶7KH8VHDQG$EXVHRI)HDU)UDQFHDQGWKH$LU0HQDFHLQWKHV·
Intelligence and National Security, 2 (1987), p. 103. Similarly, MyV\URZLF]VXJJHVWVWKDW¶7KH
idea of peace, built on the terror of aerial and chemical warfare, persisted until the epoch of 
0XQLFK·$XWRSVLHG·XQHGpIDLWH, pp. 177-178. 
10 R. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, (New York, 1982), p. 11. 
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plus beau·11 was dramatically superseded. As Antoine Prost has observed, 
war was now represented as horrifically modern, reflecting the technological 
advancements made since the Great War.12 Pacifism also permeated cinema, 
literature and radio,13 whilst pacifist doctrine was vocally advocated within 
the legions of anciens combattants14, the teaching profession15 and amongst 
students.16 Above all, a visceral hatred of war emerged from the bitter 
experiences of 1914-18, the unprecedented loss of life, and the concomitant 
physical and psychological scars.  
Consequently, at a time of profound ideological polarisation, French 
society has been represented as unanimous only in the shared conviction 
¶Surtout pas de guerre·17 But a fundamental problem arises from the 
tendency to equate pacifism with defeatism. The distinction between the two 
concepts is too often blurred, stemming partly from attempts to use the 
history of the interwar period as an explanatory tool with which to analyse 
the defeat of 1940. Indeed, within the vibrant historiography of the fall of 
)UDQFHWKH¶GHFDGHQFH·WKHVLVLPSOLFLWO\VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHVHHGVRIPRUDO
decay, sown in the legacy of the Great War and nourished throughout the 
LQWHUZDUSHULRGUHVXOWHGLQD¶GHFDGHQW·)UDQFHLQIXVHGZLWKGHIHDWLVP
                                                 
11 From a popular military hymn of the First World War, cited in C. Rearick, The French in 
Love and War: Popular Culture in the Era of the World Wars, (New Haven, 1997), p. 1. 
12 A. Prost, Republican Identities in War and Peace: Representations of France in the 19
th 
and 
20
th 
Centuries, translated by J. Winter and H. McPhail, (Oxford, 2002), p. 98. 
13 (*6WUHEHOIRUH[DPSOHFODLPVWKDW)UHQFKFLQHPD¶contributed to a defeatist 
mentality, to a psychological acceptance of the Munich DJUHHPHQWVDQGWRWKHGHIHDW·
¶3ROLWLFDO3RODULVDWLRQDQG)UHQFK&LQHPD-·LQ13URQD\DQG':6SULQJHGV
Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918-45, (London, 1982). See also Rearick, The French in 
Love and War, pp. 220-241. Similarly, popular literature recalled the horrors of the last war 
and predicted the even more catastrophic consequences of the next. See Mysyrowicz, 
$XWRSVLHG·XQHGpIDLWH, pp. 278-304. Elsewhere, Crémieux-Brilhac has argued that radio 
SHUSHWXDWHGIHDUVRIWKH¶QH[W·war by graphically portraying the devastation of aerial 
bombardment, /HV)UDQoDLVGHO·$QWRPH,/DJXHUUHRXLRXQRQ" p. 85. 
14 For pacifism among French war veterans, see Prost, Les anciens combattants, iii. 
15 Weber, The Hollow Years, p. 20. Mona SiHJHOFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHWHDFKHUV·SDFLILVW
OHDQLQJVEHFDPH¶DPDWWHURISROLWLFDOLPSRUWDQFHWRWKHHQWLUHQDWLRQ·¶¶7RWKH8QNQRZQ
0RWKHURIWKH8QNQRZQ6ROGLHU·3DFLILVP)HPLQLVPDQGWKH3ROLWLFVRI6H[XDO'LIIHUHQFH
among French Institutrices betweeQWKH:DUV·French Historical Studies, 22 (1999), p. 429. 
See also idem, The Moral Disarmament of France. 
16 J. Jackson, The Fall of France, pp. 147-148. Jean-François Sirinelli notes how the 
pacifism within the Écoles Normales ¶UHPDLQHGVROLGO\HVWDEOLVKHG·WKURXJKRXWWKHV
Génération intellectuelle, p. 534. 
17 This observation was notably made by Duroselle in La décadence, p. 169. 
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simply unable to meet the demands of modern war.18 Implicitly or explicitly, 
such analyses suggest that pacifism left the nation psychologically 
unprepared, riddled with defeatist sentiment.  
Although revisionist and post-revisionist interpretations have 
challenged this thesis,19 the impact of pacifism continues to be given 
prominence, as many of those who generally refute the more critical 
conclusions of the decadence school continue to suggest that pacifism 
contributed to the politics of the French defeat. Julian Jackson, for example, 
VXJJHVWVWKDW)UDQFHHPHUJHGIURPWKH*UHDW:DUD¶SURIRXQGO\SDFLILVW
VRFLHW\·WKH]HQLWKRIZKLFKZDVWKH0XQLFK$JUHHPHQWRI6HSWHPEHU
Similarly, François-Georges Dreyfus has written that French policy-makers 
ZHUHFRQVFLRXVRID¶ODWHQWSDFLILVPDQGUHIXVDORIZDU·WKXVFRQWULEXWLQJWR
¶WKHGHIHDWWKHDFFHSWDQFHRIDQDUPLVWLFHDQGWKH9LFK\UHJLPH·20  
6XFKDQDO\VHVLQYDULDEO\XVHSDFLILVPDVD¶FDWFK-DOO·WHUP
encompassing many diverse sentiments regarding the prospect of war. 
However, several analyses provide more sophisticated arguments, 
distinguishing between different varieties of French pacifism.21 More 
VSHFLILFDOO\0RQD6LHJHO·VDQDO\VLVRIWKHSDFLILVPRI)UHQFKVFKRROteachers 
reveals not only how different forms of pacifism infused their politics, but 
                                                 
18 The best-NQRZQH[SUHVVLRQRIWKLVDUJXPHQWLV'XURVHOOH·VLa décadence, although the 
fundamental tenets of the argument are forwarded more systematically elsewhere, notably 
in A. Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, (London, 1979), P. 
Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1932-1936, (Princeton, 1988) and N. 
Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe: The Dilemmas of French Impotence, 1919-
1940&DPEULGJH:HEHU·VGHVFULSWLYHDFFRXQWRI)UHQFKVRFLHW\LQWKHVThe 
Hollow Years, also lends itself to the decadence thesis. 
19 )RUDPRUHGHWDLOHGRYHUYLHZRIWKHKLVWRULRJUDSK\VHH3-DFNVRQ¶5HWXUQLQJWRWKH)DOO
RI)UDQFH5HFHQW:RUNRQWKH&DXVHVDQG&RQVHTXHQFHVRIWKH´6WUDQJH'HIHDWµRI·
Modern & Contemporary France, 12 (2004), 513-536. 
20 J. Jackson, The Fall of France, pp. 147-'UH\IXV¶/HSDFLILVPHHQ)UDQFH·S 
21 Ingram distinguishes between a pacifisme ancien style, essentially an ideological pacifism 
prominent during the 1920s, and a more ideologically motivated pacifisme nouveau style 
that emerged in the 1930s. The Politics of DissentS,QJUDP·Vpacifisme ancien style can 
be considered akin to the category of ideological pacifists identified by Roger Chickering in 
his study of German pacifism prior to World War One, Imperial Germany and a World 
Without War: The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914, (Princeton, 1975), whilst 
pacifism nouveau style FDQEHVHHQDVUHVHPEOLQJWKHXWRSLDQSDFLILVWVRI&KLFNHULQJ·V
analysis. ,QJUDPDOVRLGHQWLILHVDWKLUGVWUDQG¶IHPLQLVWSDFLILVP·6HHLGHP¶´1RXVDOORQV
YHUVOHVPRQDVWqUHVµ)UHQFK3DFLILVPDQGWKH&ULVLVRIWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU·LQ06
Alexander and K. Mouré (eds.), Crisis and Renewal in France, 1918-1962, (Oxford, 2002), p. 
133. Others who distinguish between various forms of pacifism include Biondi, La mêlée 
des pacifistesSDQG'UH\IXV¶/HSDFLILVPHHQ)UDQFH·S 
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DOVRKRZWKH\PDQLIHVWHGWKHPVHOYHVDVD¶SDWULRWLFSDFLILVP·HQFDSVXODWLQJ
a widespread disdain for war without undermining loyalty to the Republic.22 
Furthermore, SiegeOULJKWO\QRWHVWKDW)UHQFKVFKRROWHDFKHUV·SDFLILVPGLG
QRWIRVWHU¶DQDWPRVSKHUHRIGHFDGHQFH·E\FRQWUDVWWKHLUSDWULRWLFSDFLILVP
KHOSVH[SODLQZK\ZKHQWKH¶5HSXEOLFZDVGLUHFWO\WKUHDWHQHG)UHQFKPHQ
and women overwhelmingly rallied to its defencH·23   
Although numerous varieties of pacifism have been detected, the 
tendency to employ a more nebulous conception is problematic. The 
multifaceted nature of public opinion means that employing such 
terminology inevitably results in over-simplification. Pacifism is simply a 
single term used to describe multifarious attitudes. As Pierre Laborie 
observes, the only area of convergence is the aspiration for peace.24 War 
anxiety, therefore, is a better label for such a multitude of attitudes, 
avoiding the over-simplification that ensues when applying the more value-
ODGHQWHUP¶SDFLILVP·,QGHHG1RUPDQ,QJUDPKDVDOOXGHGWRDVLPLODU
concept in defining the pacifisme nouveau style that emerged in the late 
1920s, suggesting that it was partially defined by an anxiety regarding the 
next war.25 3DFLILVPKHVXJJHVWVZDVDSSHDOLQJE\YLUWXHRIWKH¶LQFUHDVLQJ
sense that another war could destroy civilization because of the progress 
PDGHE\VFLHQFHDQGWHFKQRORJ\VLQFHWKHHQGRIWKH*UHDW:DU·26  
,QJUDP·VDQDO\VLVLV LQIRUPHGE\0DUWLQ&HDGHO·VW\SRORJ\SDUWLFXODUO\
WKHODWWHU·VGHILQLWLRQRIWKH¶PRGHUQ-ZDUSDFLILVWV·ZKRDUJXHGWKDWMXVWZDUV
ZHUHQRORQJHUSRVVLEOH¶LQYLHZRIWKHLQGLVFULPLQDWHGHVWUXFWLYHQHVVRI
PRGHUQWHFKQRORJ\·27 &RQVHTXHQWO\¶PRGHUQ-war pacLILVWV·ZHUH¶WKHILUVWWR
believe that it was possible to show, on a utilitarian calculation of the likely 
SURVDQGFRQVWKDWQRIXWXUHZDUFRXOGHYHUEHZRUWKILJKWLQJ·28 Borrowing 
from Ceadel, Ingram provides a conceptual distinction between different 
YDULHWLHVRI)UHQFKSDFLILVP+RZHYHU,QJUDP·VFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNLV
                                                 
22 Siegel, The Moral Disarmament of France, p. 227. 
23 Ibid. p. 227. 
24 Laborie, /·2SLQLRQIUDQoDLVHVRXV9LFK\, pp. 87-89. For more on the diversity of pacifism, 
VHH%LRQGL·VDSSURSULDWHO\WLWOHGLa mêlée des pacifistses. 
25 Ingram, The Politics of Dissent, p. 129. 
26 Ibid. p. 127. 
27 M. Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War, (Oxford, 1988), p. 143. 
28 Ibid. pp. 151-152. 
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applied only to overtly pacifist organisations rather than mainstream French 
RSLQLRQUHVXOWLQJLQDQDQDO\VLVH[SOLFLWO\FRQILQHGWR¶WKRVHPHQZRPHQ
and organizations in interwar France for whom peace was a primary, 
FRQVLVWHQWDQGRYHUULGLQJFRQFHUQDQGJRDO·29 War anxiety, however, was 
not confined to these individuals or organizations. Attachment to peace was 
widespread in interwar France and it is therefore essential that the 
application of war anxiety is not confined to those with a developed and 
politicized pacifism.  
Equally, it is imperative to avoid interpreting all manifestations of war 
anxiety as pacifism. A concept of war anxiety benefits from a definitional 
clarity, and is thus better suited to explaining the more general attitudes of 
the French public towards the prospect of war. In particular, it avoids the 
QHJDWLYHLPSOLFDWLRQVRISDFLILVPQRWDEO\WKHEHOLHIWKDWSDFLILVWVDUH¶VFDUHG·
of war. Although many dreaded the GHYDVWDWLRQRIWKH¶QH[WZDU·PDQ\
would choose to fight if the territorial integrity of France was at stake. War 
anxiety was not confined to doctrinal pacifists, as the majority of French 
men and women during the interwar years would have unhesitatingly 
expressed a desire to avoid war. As Prost notes, this was true of nearly all 
ex-soldiers. However, Prost cannot resist equating this desire with pacifism 
DQGPRUHRYHUSURMHFWLQJLWRQWRWKHHQWLUHW\RI)UHQFKRSLQLRQ¶WKHZKROHRI
France was pacifist, and this pacifism was the reason why France did not 
RSSRVH+LWOHUHDUOLHU·30 
Most analyses of the late Third Republic implicitly suggest that 
pacifism contributed both to the capitulation at Munich in 1938 and the 
)UHQFKGHIHDWLQ,QGHHGWKHWHUP¶SDFLILVP·LPPHGLDWHO\FRQMXUHVXS
such negative associations. War anxiety can thus prove beneficial in moving 
beyond such connotations, facilitating a study of public attitudes towards 
the prospect of war on their own terms, rather than through the prism of the 
1940 defeat. Moreover, it accounts for the fact that the number of integral or 
absolute pacifists was always relatively small, leading Ingram to describe his 
                                                 
29 Ingram, The Politics of Dissent, p. 8. 
30 3URVW¶7KH,PSDFWRI:DURQ)UHQFKDQG*HUPDQ3ROLWLFDO&XOWXUHV·The Historical 
Journal, 37 (1994), p. 210. 
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VWXG\RI)UHQFKSDFLILVPDVGHDOLQJ¶ZLWKWKHSROLWLFVRIWKHPDUJLQV·31 By 
contrast, war anxiety was not confined to the margins, although it was often 
difficult to distinguish it from the vocal representations of opinion 
emanating from marginal pacifist movements. Nevertheless, by 1938-9, 
reactive representations of public opinion demonstrated that war anxiety 
was more pronounced than pacifism. Consequently, it helps us to 
understand how the Daladier government was able to adopt a politique de 
fermeté without outrunning a seemingly pacifist public opinion. 
 
II 
 
In the period of 1938 preceding the Munich Agreement, reactive 
representations of opinion continued to reinforce the residual representation 
of widespread pacifist sentiment. Police reports conveyed numerous 
examples of the integral pacifism embraced by a small minority. At a 
meeting of the Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix (LICP) on 31 
March 1938, Guy Jernan, of the Anciens Combattants Pacifistes, argued that 
¶WKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRI&]HFKRVORYDNLDPXVWQRWEHDPRWLYHIRUZDU·32 
Although the LICP was a marginal organisation, such reactive 
representations served to reinforce the residual perception of a pacifist 
French public. However, it was not only doctrinal pacifists who were deeply 
XQVHWWOHGE\WKHSURVSHFWRIZDU$V1RUPDQ,QJUDPKDVQRWHG¶,QD
country which had borne the brunt of the Great War public opinion and 
SROLWLFLDQVDOLNHWRRNVHULRXVO\WKHSDFLILVWFU\¶plus jamais ça!··33 
As the Czechoslovakian crisis threatened to escalate into war, the 
residual representation of pacifism constrained French policymakers. 
Moreover, contemporary events exacerbated a more widespread war anxiety. 
The horror and revulsion provoked by the news and imagery of modern 
warfare in Spain heightened the conviction that such events must not be 
                                                 
31 Ingram, The Politics of Dissent, pp. 15-16. 
32 A[rchives] de la P[réfecture] de la P[olice], BA/1777: Police report, 31 March ² meeting 
organized by the LICP, 30 March 1938. For more on the LICP, see Ingram, The Politics of 
Dissent, passim. 
33 ,QJUDP¶´1RXVDOORQVYHUVOHVPRQDVWqUHVµ·S 
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allowed to occur in France. Newsreels, photo-journalism and evocative 
newspaper articles graphically relayed the horrors of war to the French 
people. The French Premier, Édouard Daladier was not immune to these 
anxieties. In a speech of 16 June 1938, he referred to the bombings in Spain 
DV¶DQDWWDFNRQFLYLOLVDWLRQLWVHOI·ODPHQWLQJWKHORVVRI¶FHQWXULHVRIKHULWDJH
DQGWKRXVDQGVRILQQRFHQWOLYHV·34 
 War anxiety greatly influenced public and political reactions to the 
Czechoslovakian crisis, particularly as there was no guarantee of British 
assistance in the event of a conflict with Germany. As the British 
DPEDVVDGRULQ3DULV6LU(ULF3KLSSVQRWHGWKHUHZDV¶D strong movement 
in right circles against France fighting for Czechoslovakia unless assured of 
%ULWLVKVXSSRUW·35 Such concerns were not confined to the political right. As 
/DFD]HREVHUYHV¶LQWKHVXPPHURIWKHSUHVVFRQWLQXHGWRJLYHDOOLWV
support to Franco-%ULWLVKFRRSHUDWLRQ·36 For all, the spectre of war loomed 
on the horizon, and the potential repercussions of a future European 
conflict weighed heavily. The American Ambassador, William Bullitt, 
encapsulated the prevailing mood when informing President Roosevelt that, 
¶LIZDUVKRXOGEHJLQWKHUHVXOWZRXOGEHVXFKDGHYDVWDWLRQRI(XURSHWKDWLW
would make small difference which side should emerge the ostensible 
YLFWRU·37 
 Unsurprising, the willingness of the French public to go to war on 
behalf of Czechoslovakia was questioned. The British Military Attaché in 
3DULV&RORQHO:LOOLDP)UDVHUKDGKLVGRXEWV¶:KHWKHURUQRWWKH)UHQFK
DUHSUHSDUHGWRILJKWVHHPVDOLWWOHXQFHUWDLQ·+HDOVRUHIHUUHGWRWKHYLHZRI
WKH(PEDVV\·VSUHVVDWWDFKp&KDUOHV0HQGOZKRZDV¶PRVWHPSKDWLFLQKLV
opinion that the French will not fight except in self-GHIHQFH·38 Undoubtedly, 
certain influential circles in France were vocally hostile to intervention on 
                                                 
34 $UFKLYHVG·KLVWRLUHFRQWHPSRUDLQH&HQWUHG·KLVWRLUHGH6FLHQFHV3R, Fonds Roger 
Genebrier, GE6: Allocution de M. Daladier, Président du Conseil, au Comité Exécutif du 
Parti radical socialiste, 15 June 1938. 
35 T[he] N[ational] A[rchives], FO 371/21599/C3388/55/17: Phipps to Halifax, 24 April 
1938. 
36 Lacaze, /·RSLQLRQSXEOLTXHIUDQoDLVHHWODFULVHGH0XQLch, p. 197. 
37 Bullitt to Roosevelt, 31 August 1938, in O. H. Bullitt (ed.), For the President, Personal and 
Secret: Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, (Boston, 1972), 
p. 283. 
38 TNA, WO 106/5413: Fraser to van Cutsem, 31 August 1938. 
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behalf of the Czechoslovakians, providing a voluble reactive representation 
of French opinion. The press were pivotal in furnishing such 
representations, not least following the publication on 7 September of a 
notorious leading article in The Times advocating the cession of the Sudeten 
areas to Germany. This article provoked considerable debate in the pages of 
the French press, with several writers applauding the stance taken by the 
London paper. Émile Roche, director of the Radical newspaper, La 
République, had already made such a suggestion the previous day, and cited 
the Times article with approval on both the 8th and the 9th of September. The 
leader of the far-right Parti populaire français, Jacques Doriot, in La Liberté, 
and Stéphane Lauzanne, chief editor of Le Matin, did likewise on 9 
September, while Léon Bailby provided further favourable comment in the 
Jour-Écho de Paris on 10 September.   
Similar reactive representations were provided by Pierre-Étienne 
Flandin, who distributed numerous leaflets and tracts around Paris 
advocating a peaceful settlement of the Czechoslovakian crisis. Moreover, on 
14 September, he informed the British Prime Minister that French public 
RSLQLRQ¶LVPRUHOLNHO\WREHLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIQRQ-intervention than that of 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ·39 Flandin also made his opinions known to the British press, 
commenting to staff at the Paris offices of the Daily Express WKDW¶WKH&KLHIRI
WKH)UHQFK$UP\KDGWROGKLPWKDWD)UHQFKGHIHDWZDVFHUWDLQ·7KH
PDMRULW\RIWKH)UHQFKSHRSOHGHVLUHGSHDFHKHFRQWLQXHG¶>L@WLVWKH
communists and the Jews who are leading us into this war. They are 
GHWHUPLQHGWRSXVKXVLQWRLW·40 $OWKRXJK)ODQGLQ·VFRPPHQWVZHUHLQ
NHHSLQJZLWKWKH¶QHR-SDFLILVP·DGRSWHGE\VHFWLRQVRIWKH)UHQFKULJKWIURP
the mid-1930s,41 the extent to which it reflected a genuine pacifist 
sentiment must be questioned. Indeed, it can be seen as political 
profiteering, the right seeking to exploit an underlying war anxiety by 
                                                 
39 TNA, PREM 1/249: Flandin to Chamberlain, 14 September 1938. 
40 House of Lords Record Office, Beaverbrook Papers, BBK/B/293: Letter to Beaverbrook 
from Lord Forbes (from the Paris offices of the Daily Express), 25 September 1938, detailing 
notes of an interview with Flandin. 
41 7KHQRWLRQRIDFRQVHUYDWLYH¶QHR-SDFLILVP·ZDVQRWHGDVHDUO\DVE\&0LFDXGThe 
French Right and Nazi Germany, pp. 152 and passim.  J. Jackson has also used this 
terminology, in France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944, (Oxford, 2001), pp. 89-92, as has 
Azéma, De Munich à la libération, pp. 12-14. 
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castigating leftist war mongering. Flandin allegedly remarked that he had 
embraced pacifism in order to avoid a leftist ¶monopoly of the pacifist 
SODWIRUPZKLFKZDVEULQJLQJWKHPVRPXFKHOHFWRUDOVXFFHVV·42 
 Nevertheless, reactive representations of opinion during September 
1938 largely reinforced the residual representation of widespread pacifism. 
The French teaching and postal unions petitioned Daladier on 26 September 
to argue against going to war over the Sudeten question, reinforcing the 
belief that these unions remained a bastion of pacifism.43 Furthermore, the 
pacifist fringe of the SFIO advocated a similar line. ¶1Dturally, the Sudeten 
SUREOHPLVWKHPRVWFULWLFDOWKHPRVWSUHVVLQJWREHUHVROYHG·ZURWH3DXO
)DXUHRQ6HSWHPEHU¶DQGLWPXVWEHGRQHE\SDFLILFPHDQV·44 Similarly, 
at a meeting of the SFIO Parliamentary Group on 29 September, Faure told 
Jean Zyromski, prominent within the Bataille Socialiste section of the SFIO, 
that he would rather be accused of being Hitlerite than be accused of war-
mongering, a response applauded by a large majority of those in 
attendance.45 
 $OWKRXJK)DXUH·VSRVLWLRQFDQEHGHILQed as pacifism, it would be 
GLVLQJHQXRXVWRODEHODV¶SDFLILVWV·DOOWKRVHZKRIDYRXUHGDSHDFHIXOVROXWLRQ
to the Czechoslovakian crisis. Léon Blum, for example, had largely 
DEDQGRQHGDSDFLILVWSRVLWLRQE\\HWKHZHOFRPHG&KDPEHUODLQ·V
decision to fly to Germany in an effort to resolve the crisis peacefully 
WKURXJKGLVFXVVLRQVZLWK+LWOHU¶[T]he audacious decision of M. Neville 
&KDPEHUODLQ·ZURWH%OXP¶>LV@DFKDQFHIRUSHDFH«7KDWLVZK\,DSSODXG
«ZHDSSODXGDOOWKDWUHQGHUVZDUPRUHGLIILFXOW·46 0RUHRYHUHYHQ+LWOHU·V
increased demands at the Godesberg meeting with Chamberlain on 22 
September failed to lead to a hardening of opinion analogous to that seen in 
                                                 
42 )ODQGLQ·VFRPPHQWVDVUHOD\HGE\/pY\The Truth about France, p. 119. 
43 09DwVVH¶/HSDVVpLQVXSSRUWDEOHOHVSDFLILVPHV·Vingtième Siècle, 3 
(1984), p. 34.  However, Mona Siegel has recently illustrated that, by the mid-1930s, many 
schoolteachers had dramatically altered their opinions despite the official line of the 
Syndicat national des instituteurs (SN) leadership. M. Siegel, The Moral Disarmament of 
France, Ch. 6. Conflict between anti-fascism and integral pacifism has also been identified 
ZLWKLQWKHZRPHQ·VSDFLILVWPRYHPHQWLQ(&DUOH¶:RPHQ$QWL-Fascism and Peace in 
,QWHUZDU)UDQFH*DEULHOOH'XFKrQH·V,WLQHUDU\·French History, 18 (2004), 291-314. 
44 Le Populaire, 18 September 1938. 
45 $33%$3ROLFHUHSRUW6HSWHPEHU¶­OD&KDPEUH· 
46 Le Populaire, 15 September 1938. 
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Britain.47 $V/DFD]HKDVQRWHG¶LI+LWOHU·V*RGHVEHUJGHPDQGVSURYRNHG
unanimous resistance in the British press, this unanimity was not 
HQFRXQWHUHGLQWKH3DULVLDQQHZVSDSHUV·48 
The majority of reactive representations of opinion therefore reinforced 
the belief that pacifism remained prominent. This was certainly the British 
interpretation, and when Daladier and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Georges Bonnet, visited London on 25 and 26 September, the British 
ministers did not hesitate to suggest that French opinion was unwilling to go 
to war. $V'DODGLHUUHFDOOHG¶WKH\LQYRNHG)UHQFKQHZVSDSHUVDGYRFDWLQJ
VXEPLVVLRQWR+LWOHU>DQG@WKHKRVWLOLW\RIDVHFWLRQRI)UHQFKRSLQLRQ·
Daladier retorted¶at this moment a million Frenchmen pass to the frontiers, 
without any incident and without weakness of morale. You ask me, without 
enthusiasm? Do you believe, therefore, that it is with enthusiasm that I have 
DVNHGWKHPWRUHVSRQGWRP\DSSHDO"· 49 ,I'DODGLHU·VFRQIHVVHGODFNRI
enthusiasm for war reflected a latent war anxiety, Bonnet was convinced 
that these DQ[LHWLHVZHUHVKDUHGE\WKHPDVVRI)UHQFKRSLQLRQ¶>'@R\RX
NQRZZKDWZDULVOLNH"·KHDVNHG the journalist *HQHYLqYH7DERXLV¶:DU
with bombs"·¶,IZDUEUHDNVRXW·KHFRQWLQXHG¶WKHUHZLOOEHDUHYROXWLRQ
and the people will throw me into WKHULYHU·50 The policymaking elites were 
acutely conscious of a widespread war anxiety, as practically everyone in 
France were apprehensive of the potential repercussions of a Franco-
German conflict. But a lack of enthusiasm for war is not indicative of 
pacifism, and few preached a policy of peace at any price. The dominant 
reactive representations of opinion indicated that whilst there was, as Blum 
SXWLWD¶FKDQFHRISHDFH·WKLVKDGWREHVHL]HG:DUDQ[LHW\UDWKHUWKDQ
pacifism thus ensured that the Munich Agreement would be embraced. 
                                                 
47 2Q6HSWHPEHU+DOLID[VHQWDWHOHJUDPWR&KDPEHUODLQDW*RGHVEHUJQRWLQJ¶*UHDW
mass of public opinion seems to be hardening in sense of feeling that we have gone to the 
OLPLWRIFRQFHVVLRQ·'>RFXPHQWV@RQ%>ULWLVK@)>RUHLJQ@3>ROLF\@LLLQR 
48 /·RSLQLRQSXEOLTXHIUDQoDLVHHWODFULVHGH0XQLFK, p. 272. -HDQ=D\'DODGLHU·V(GXFDWLRQ
Minister, lamenWHGKRZ¶WKHSUHVVFDPSDLJQIRU)UHQFKQHXWUDOLW\République, Journal, 
Matin)ODQGLQKDVOHGWRRXUUHWUHDWDQGSRUWUD\HGXVDVGLYLGHGLQ+LWOHU·VH\HV·J. Zay, 
Carnets secrets (de Munich à la guerre), (Paris, 1942), p. 8. 
49 A[rchives] N[ationales] Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/10, 2DA3 Dr. 2, sdra: Conférence de 
Londres, 25-6HSWHPEHU1RWHVPDQXVFULWHVG·eGRXDUG'DODGLHU 
50 Cited in Geneviève Tabouis, They Called me Cassandra, written in collaboration with 
Helen Scott, (New York, 1942), p. 355 (original emphasis). 
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III 
 
'DODGLHUPXFKWRKLVVXUSULVHUHWXUQHGIURP0XQLFKWRDKHUR·VZHOFRPH51 
The initial fervour that welcomed the maintenance of peace appeared to 
most contemporary observers as heartfelt, genuine, and thoroughly 
understandable. Confirmation of this widespread sentiment was provided by 
the newspaper °XYUH, which noted that of the letters they had received from 
the public on the issue of Munich, 4,555 approved the agreement with only 
193 voicing dissent.52 Furthermore, it was not only the French press that 
lavished praise on the British Prime Minister, as many French towns 
UHQDPHGVWUHHWVLQKLVKRQRXUXPEUHOODVZHUHUHIHUUHGWRDV¶PRQ
&KDPEHUODLQ·DQGDQHZGDQFH¶/H&KDPEHUODLQ·VZHSW3DULV53 The 
overriding reactive representation of opinion in the immediate aftermath of 
Munich was relief that war had been averted, reinforcing the residual 
representation of a society so infused with pacifist sentiment that recourse 
to war was unthinkable. 
Support for Munich was also evident in parliamentary circles, with 
only the communists, the nationalist deputy Henri de Kérillis, and a sole 
socialist deputy voting against them in the French Chamber. Indeed, even 
Socialists who had abandoned pacifism welcomed the maintenance of peace. 
$V%OXPWROGWKH&KDPEHU¶7KH)UHQFKSHRSOHIHHODQLPPHQVHHODWLRQWR
KDYHDYRLGHGDZDUWKDWKDGEHHQVRFORVH·54 Inevitably, marginal pacifist 
organisations also embraced the Munich accords. The LICP claimed that 
gratitude for the reprieve belonged not to Daladier and Bonnet, but to those 
                                                 
51 )RUDQDFFRXQWRI'DODGLHU·VUHWXUQIURP0XQLFKVHHeGH&URX\-Chanel, Alexis Léger: ou 
O·DXWUHYLVDJHGH6DLQW-John Perse, (Paris, 1989), p. 235. Bonnet subsequently informed 
Lucien Lamoureux, a Deputy and former Minister, that Daladier, on the plane returning 
IURP0XQLFK¶ZDVVRPEUHDQGSUHRFFXSLHG+HGUHDGHGWKHZHOFRPHWKDWWKHSHRSOHRI
3DULVKDGLQVWRUHIRUKLP·(Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine: 
3DSLHUV/XFLHQ/DPRXUHX[¶6RXYHQLUVSROLWLTXHV·0IP. 
52 °XYUH, 4 October 1938. 
53 R. and I. Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King to the 
Present, (London, 2006), p. 534. 
54 Blum, speech to the Chambre des députés, 4 October 1938, Journal Officiel de la 
République Français, Débats et comptes-rendus, chambre des députés (hereafter JO), séance 
du 4 octobre 1938. )RUPRUHRQ%OXP·VDWWLWXGHGXULQJWKH&]HFKRVORYDNLDQFULVLVVHH1
-RUGDQ¶/pRQ%OXPDQG&]HFKRVORYDNLD-·French History, 5 (1991), 48-73. 
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SDFLILVWVZKRLPSRVHG¶DSV\FKRVLVRISHDFH·DQGWKXV¶UHQGHUHGDQLPPHQVH
VHUYLFHWRKXPDQLW\·55 These expressions of public and political opinion are 
often cited as evidence of the FrenFKSHRSOH·VOLQJHULQJSDFLILVP-HDQ-Pierre 
Azéma, for example, has remarked that Munich marked the end of an era, 
WKHFXOPLQDWLRQRIWKHSDFLILVPERUQHRXWRIWKH¶'HUGHVGHU·56  
However, not all those who approved the Munich accords were 
pacifists. Support for Munich was, above all, an expression of relief that war 
had been avoided. It was not necessarily the final, desperate act of pacifism, 
EXWVLPSO\DQRWKHUH[SUHVVLRQRIZDUDQ[LHW\7KH¶FRZDUGO\VKDPHDQG
UHOLHI·HYRNHGE\%OXPZDVFHUWDLQO\PRUHDkin to war anxiety than a 
doctrinal pacifist position.57 Furthermore, war anxiety not only explains 
public reaction to Munich, but also the hardening of opinion thereafter. 
Indeed, it is already accepted that French opinion was more divided than 
initially thought, with an October 1938 opinion poll showing only 57% 
approval for the Munich accords.58 Undoubtedly, this figure did not 
correspond with the 87.5% vote of approval in the Chamber, supporting the 
&RPPXQLVW-DFTXHV'XFORV·FODLPWKDWWKH¶SDUOLDPHQWDU\YRWHVGRQRW
WUDQVODWHWKHDPSOLWXGHRISRSXODUSURWHVW·59 Moreover, the same poll 
revealed that 70% believed that France and Britain must resist any further 
German demands. Therefore, even amongst those who had approved of 
Munich, there was a significant belief that it must not be repeated. This 
seemingly paradoxical position ² support for Munich coupled with the belief 
that analogous concessions would be intolerable - is more compatible with 
war anxiety than pacifism. Far from retreating into a pacifist shell or 
defeatist mindset, French opinion in the aftermath of Munich suggested that 
a firmer foreign policy would be embraced. 
First and foremost, this concerned the state of French defences, and 
the belief that French military weakness had been pivotal in the decision to 
                                                 
55 APP, BA/1777: Police report, 1 November 1938, citing a speech made by Aurèle Patorni 
at a meeting organized by the LICP, 31 October 1938. 
56 Azéma, De Munich à la libération, p.18. 
57 Le Populaire, 19 September 1938. 
58 On early French opinion polls, conducted by the InstiWXWIUDQoDLVG·RSLQLRQSXEOLTXH
,)23VHH&3H\UHILWWH¶/HVSUHPLHUVVRQGDJHVG·RSLQLRQ·LQ55pPRQGDQG-%RXUGLQ
(eds.), Édouard Daladier, chef de gouvernement, (Paris, 1977), pp. 265-278. 
59 Humanité, 7 October 1938. 
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appease Germany. Military considerations had certainly been foremost in 
'DODGLHU·VPLQGGXULQJWKH&]HFKRVORYDNLDQFULVLVSDUWLFXODUO\DHULDO
deficiencies. A note on air power by General Vuillemin, Chief of the French 
$LU6WDIIRI6HSWHPEHUZDVGHVFULEHGE\'DODGLHUDV¶PRUHSHVVLPLVWLF
WKDQQRUPDO·60 Such concerns undoubtedly influenced French policy, and 
were subsequently the subject of press discussion. Blum was convinced that 
¶WKHFRPSDUDWLYHUHSRUWVRQPLOLWDU\DYLDWLRQSOD\HGDFRQVLGHUDEOHUROH· in 
the frantic diplomacy of the previous weeks.61 Furthermore, the need for 
protection against aerial bombardment became prominent, and several 
French newspapers vehemently campaigned for French aerial deficiencies to 
be UHFWLILHG2Q2FWREHUO·Intransigeant FDUULHGWKHKHDGOLQH¶3ODQHV
SODQHV,V)UDQFHUHVLJQHGWRGLHRUGRHVVKHKDYHWKHZLOOWROLYH"·7KLV
campaign would continue for the next week, vigorously urging the necessity 
of augmenting French air power.62    
It soon became apparent that support for Munich was ephemeral, 
suggesting that the instinctive relief at avoiding war was motivated by 
UHVLGXDODQ[LHWLHVUHJDUGLQJWKH¶QH[WZDU·UDWKHUthan a deeply-rooted 
pacifism. Certainly, there was little indication of doctrinal pacifism by late 
November 1938, when the majority of the French public rallied behind the 
JRYHUQPHQW·VILUPUHVSRQVHWRWKH,WDOLDQGHPDQGVIRU&RUVLFD1LFHDQGWKH
Haut-SaYRLH'DODGLHU·VVWDWHPHQWWRWKH&KDPEHUWKDW¶)UDQFHZLOOQRWFHGH
DQLQFKRIWHUULWRU\·63 was well-received by French newspapers of all political 
persuasions.64 Indeed, press reactions to the Italian claims were 
characterized by incredulity and disdain. Even the far right, which had 
espoused a neo-pacifist agenda at the time of Munich - the headline in the 
Action française RQ6HSWHPEHUUHDG¶1RQ3DVOD*XHUUH·- rejected the 
outlandish Italian demands. Je Suis Partout dismissed the demands as 
having ¶WKHH[DFWVDPHLQWULQVLFYDOXHDVWKHGHPDQGVRIP\OLWWOHGDXJKWHU
                                                 
60 AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/32, 4DA5, Dr. 5, sdre: Note on a letter from Vuillemin of 26 
September 1938.   
61 Le Populaire, 17 October 1938. 
62 Intransigeant, 15-22 October 1938. See also Paris-Soir, 15-16 October 1938, for a similar 
press campaign. 
63 JO, Chambre des députés: Daladier speech, 13 December 1938. 
64 'XURVHOOHKDVVXJJHVWHGWKDW'DODGLHU·VILUPQHVVZDVSDUWO\DWWULEXWDEOHWRWKHZHLJKWRI
public opinion, La décadence, p.391. 
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WKH\DUHWKHZRUGVRIFKLOGUHQ·7KLVLWZDVDUJXHGZDVYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURP
0XQLFK¶VLQFHRXUSRVVHVVLRQVDUHWDUJHWHGWKHSHDFHRI0XQLFKLVQRWD
SUHFHGHQW·65 
As France galvanized around a firm response to Mussolini, reactive 
representations of opinion no longer reinforced the residual representation 
RISDFLILVP'DODGLHU·VYLVLWWR1RUWK$IULFDDQG&RUVLFDLQHDUO\-DQXDU\
1939, widely covered not only in the printed press but also in cinema 
newsreels, contributed to an upsurge in patriotic sentiment and, moreover, 
of pride and faith in the loyalty and strength of the French Empire.66 
Mainstream popular culture also conveyed more optimistic messages. 
Within French cinema, the pacifist films of the early 1930s gave way to 
pictures that, whilst not glorifying war or revelling in the prospect of a future 
conflict, nonetheless portrayed French courage and ingenuity in face of the 
German menace. Bravery and guile replaced cowardice and decadence; the 
Maginot Line was celebrated, and the valour and glory of the Empire 
upheld.67 Officially sanctioned films sought to capitalize upon this perceived 
sentiment, with productions such as Unité française and Sommes-nous 
défendus UHLWHUDWLQJ)UDQFH·Vstrength and unity. Unité française, released 
MXVWDIWHU'DODGLHU·VYR\DJHFRQWDLQHGVXFKVWDWHPHQWVDV¶7KLVFRXQWU\
SDFLILFDQGWUDQTXLOLVFDSDEOHRIIDFLQJDOODWWDFNVDQGDOOFKDOOHQJHV·68   
French opinion appeared to relish manifestations of French firmness 
DQGUHVROYH$JRYHUQPHQWQRWHVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHSUHVV¶RSWLPLVWLFDOO\
DZDLWVWKHLQLWLDOHFKRHVRI'DODGLHU·VYR\DJHLQ7XQLVLD·69 'DODGLHU·VYLVLW
coupled with the unity of French opinion in light of the Italian demands, 
also helped convince Britain of French resolve, dissuading Chamberlain 
from seeking to mediate between Paris and Rome during his forthcoming 
                                                 
65 P.-A. Cousteau, ¶/D)UDQFHQ·HVWSDVOHSqUH1RsO· Je Suis Partout, 9 December 1938. 
66 For more on QHZVUHHOFRYHUDJHRI'DODGLHU·VYR\DJHVHH0%HQWHOL'-D\DQG--P. 
-HDQFRODV¶/HFLQpPDIUDQoDLVWKqPHVHWSXEOLF·LQ5pPRQGDQG%RXUGLQHGVLa France 
et les Français, pp. 34-35. 
67 For more on the content and impact of French cinema during this period, see Benteli, Jay 
and Jeancolas, ibid.; Rearick, The French in Love and War, pp. 234-235; R. Pithon, 
¶2SLQLRQVSXEOLTXHVHWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVFXOWXUHOOHVIDFHDX[SUREOqPHVGHODSXLVVDQce: le 
témoignage du cinema français (1938-·Relations internationales, 33 (1983), pp. 91-
DQG6WUHEHO¶3ROLWLFDO3RODULVDWLRQDQG)UHQFK&LQHPD-·SS-170. 
68 Cited in Laborie, /·2SLQLRQIUDQoDLVHVRXV9LFK\, p. 119. 
69 $1)0LQLVWqUHGHV&RORQLHV6HUYLFH,QWHUFRORQLDOG·LQIRUPDWLRQHWGH
documentation, Bulletin Quotidien, 2 January 1939. 
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YLVLWWRWKH,WDOLDQFDSLWDO'DODGLHU·VVXFFHVVLQSRUWUD\LQJDUHGLVFRYHUHG
)UHQFKSDWULRWLVPDQGXQLW\ZDVWKHUHIRUHSURSLWLRXV¶1RWKLQJFRXOGEHWWHU
SUHSDUHWKHYLVLWWR5RPHRI0U&KDPEHUODLQDQG/RUG+DOLID[·FRPPHQWHG
the Journal des débats¶WKDQWKHSUHVHQWWULSRI0'DODGLHU·6LPLODUO\Le 
Populaire emphasized that the British must be made aware, in no uncertain 
terms, that France was prepared to cede absolutely nothing to Italy.70 
Reactive representations of French opinion in early 1939 
demonstrated that the French people were prepared, if necessary, to forcibly 
resist unreasonable demands. Simultaneously, representations of French 
pacifism became increasingly infrequent, gradually eroding the residual 
perception of a pacifist-infused populace. Indeed, within the SFIO, growing 
support for the blumiste position suggested that the pacifist paulfauristes 
were becoming marginalized. At the SFIO congress at Montrouge in late 
'HFHPEHU%OXP·VILUPQHVVWULXPSKHGRYHU3DXO)DXUH·VSDFLILVP71 
However, this did not mean that French socialists had suddenly become 
war-like. A latent war anxiety persisted, but a growing feeling that war must 
one day be confronted was coming to the fore. Nevertheless, the residual 
representation of pacifism had been significantly superseded, permitting and 
even encouraging the French government to pursue a foreign policy of 
firmness rather than capitulation.   
Following the German occupation of the rump Czech state on 15 
March 1939, reactive representations reinforced the perception of a public 
rapidly losing patience with the dictators. Opinion now appeared to demand 
that a firm policy be adopted not only towards Mussolini but also towards 
Hitler. If the SXEOLF·VUHVSRQVHWRWKHItalian demands had challenged the 
residual representation of widespread pacifism, the Prague coup suggested 
that such residuals had lost their potency. Pacifism was increasingly 
marginalized, confined to integral pacifists and those on the right for whom 
a fusion of fascist sympathies and virulent anti-communism manifested 
                                                 
70 Pierre Bernus, Journal des débats, politiques et littéraires, 5 January 1939; Pierre 
Brosselette, Le Populaire, 9 January 1939. 
71 For the first time, Blum forwarded a foreign policy motion in stark contrast to that 
forwarded by Paul Faure. %OXP·VPRWLRQSUHYDLOHGE\YRWHVWRILJXUHVWDNHQ
from Crémieux-Brilhac, La guerre, oui ou non?, p. 255). 
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LWVHOILQDIRUPRI¶QHR-SDFLILVP·7KHPDMRULW\RIWhe French public, by 
contrast, appeared to accept that war might be unavoidable, and that it was 
better to prepare for it than seek to avoid it at any price. For Blum, such 
UHVROYHZDVQRWLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKSDFLILVP¶7KLVLVWKHVWDWHWRZKLFKWKH
dictators have left Europe. For us Socialists, for us pacifists, the appeal of 
IRUFHLVWRGD\WKHDSSHDOIRUSHDFH·72  
 
IV 
 
Nevertheless, although doctrinal pacifist sentiment had been eroded since 
Munich, anxieties regarding the prospect of war had not been eradicated. 
Throughout the summer of 1939, war anxiety continued to linger, with 
certain representations of opinion questioning the wisdom of upholding the 
guarantee to Poland and fighting for Danzig. On 4 May, Marcel Déat 
published a now infamous article entiWOHG¶0RXULUSRXU'DQW]LJ"·'pDW·V
DUJXPHQWZDVVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG¶)LJKWLQJVLGHE\VLGHZLWKRXU3ROLVKIULHQGV
for the common defence of our territories, our rights, our freedoms, is a 
prospect we can envisage with courage, if it contributes to the maintenance 
RISHDFH%XWGLHIRU'DQ]LJ"1R·73 'pDW·VDUJXPHQWZDVKRZHYHUVLPSO\D
marginal and extreme manifestation of wider anxieties regarding the 
prospect of war. More common was the lingering influence of war anxiety 
displayed by Daladier when he told the Chamber of Deputies on 11 May that 
¶ZDUZLOOUHVROYHQRQHRIWKHSUHVHQWSUREOHPV2QWKHFRQWUDU\LWZLOOUHQGHU
WKHVROXWLRQPRUHGLIILFXOWDQGPRUHGLVDVWURXV·74 Nonetheless, Daladier 
was convinced that this must not amount to capitulation, a conviction 
supported by the majority of the French press. In contrast to Déat, the 
majority of reactive representations of opinion continued to favour a firm 
stance towards the dictatorships.75  
                                                 
72 Le Populaire, 16 April 1939. 
73 °XYUH, 4 May 1939. 
74 AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/11, 2DA4 Dr. 5: Daladier speech to the Chamber, 11 May 
1939. 
75 2QWKHULJKW'pDW·VDUWLFOHIRXQGOLWWOHVXSSRUW,QGHHGKLVDUJXPHQWZDVVXEVHTXHQWO\
GLVPLVVHGE\:ODGLPLUG·2UPHVVRQLQLe Figaro0D\)RU0LFDXG'pDW·VSRVLWLRQ
FRXOGEHFODVVLILHGDVWKDWRID¶UHVLJQHGQDWLRQDOLVW·DORQJZLWKWKHOLNHVRI%DLOE\7KH
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Certainly, there were few DGKHUHQWVWR'pDW·VSRVLWLRQODUJHO\FRQfined 
to the integral pacifists of the LICP who expressed a similar sentiment in 
their journal, Le BarrageXQGHUWKHKHDGOLQH¶/D*XHUUHGH'DQW]LJQ·DXUD
SDVOLHX·76 Indeed, mainstream opinion is arguably better reflected by an 
opinion poll showing that 76% of respondents believed that France should, if 
necessary, use force to preserve the status of Danzig.77 5LJKWZLQJ¶QHR-
SDFLILVP·FHUWDLQO\VXEVLGHG, and its more notorious proponents became 
increasingly estranged from mainstream conservative opinion. William Irvine 
KDVREVHUYHGWKDWE\WKHHQGRI)ODQGLQKDG¶EHFRPHDQREYLRXV
embarrassment to many leaders of the party [the Alliance Démocratique] 
who took some pains to distance themselves publicly from his Munich 
VWDQFH·78 Moreover, in late 1938 and early 1939, the mainstream 
conservative press did not endorse the pro-German or pro-fascist rhetoric 
evident in such journals as Je Suis Partout or Gringoire.  
In short, 'DODGLHU·VILUPQHVVZDVPRUHDWWXQHGWRWKHperceived 
demands of the majority of French public opinion. Since Munich, reactive 
representations had revealed a growing determination to resist the dictators, 
eroding the residual representation of a public infused with pacifism and 
thus willing to countenance concession and capitulation for the sake of 
peace. Somewhat paradoxically, war anxiety actually added impetus to a 
firm foreign policy, as deterring Hitler by means of a ¶SHDFHEORF·ZDV
considered the most effective way of maintaining peace. Consequently, only 
extremist sections of opinion, such as far-right anti-Semitic organisations, 
integral pacifists, or isolated groups of far-left socialist revolutionaries 
                                                                                                                                                        
¶UHVLJQHGQDWLRQDOLVWV·VXJJHVWV0LFDXGZHUHDORQHRQWKHULJKWLQWKHLUFRQWLQXHG
advocacy of appeasement, oppRVHGE\WKH¶FRQGLWLRQDOQDWLRQDOLVWV·VXFKDVWKRVH
represented by Le FigaroDQGWKH¶WUDGLWLRQDOQDWLRQDOLVWV·VXFKDV+HQULGH.pULOOLV
Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany, pp. 212-221. 
76 Le Barrage, 13 July 1939.  This was an allusion to Jean GLUDXGRX[·VSOD\¶/D
JXHUUHGHWURLHQ·DXUDSDVOLHX·ZKLFKZDVDQGKDVVXEVHTXHQWO\EHHQUHJDUGHGDV
profoundly pacifist in sentiment. For more on the growing marginalisation of the LICP in 
late 1938 and 1939, see Ingram, The Politics of Dissent. With regard to Déat, Azéma has 
observed that with the exception of the extreme-right and integral pacifists, political and 
SXEOLFRSLQLRQJHQHUDOO\FRQGHPQHG'pDW·VDUWLFOH(De Munich à la libération, pp. 33-35). 
77 IFOP poll conducted in June and July 1939, cited in C.-5$JHURQ¶/·2SLQLRQSXEOLTXH
IUDQoDLVHSHQGDQWOHVFULVHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOHVGHVHSWHPEUHjMXLOOHW·LQCahiers de 
O·,QVWLWXWG·+LVWRLUHGHOD3UHVVHHWGHO·2SLQLRQ, (Tours, 1974-75), p. 216. 
78 :',UYLQH¶'RPHVWLF3ROLWLFVDQGWKH)DOORI)UDQFHLQ·LQ-%ODWWHGThe French 
Defeat of 1940: Reassessments, (Oxford, 1998), p. 90. 
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continued to preach a strictly pacifist agenda. The Étudiants anti-juifs 
published a tracWFODLPLQJ¶7KH-HZLVWKHZDU*XLOW\IRUDQGEHQHILFLDU\
of, the slaughter of 1914, the Judeo-Masonic capitalists prepare a new war 
LQZKLFK\RXZLOOEHWKHILUVWYLFWLPV·2QWKHRWKHUVLGHRIWKHSROLWLFDO
spectrum, an orator at a meeting of the Union des Amicales 
Socialistes UHPDUNHG¶:HHVWLPDWHWKDWEHWZHHQDZDUIRU+LWOHU·V¶OLYLQJ
VSDFH·DQGDQRWKHUIRUWKHGHIHQFHRI'DODGLHU·V(PSLUHWKHUHLVDSODFHIRU
SHDFHFUHDWHGE\6RFLDOLVP·79  
However, such tendencies of opinion were marginal. Another tract 
intercepted by the police, distributed by de Kérillis, was more attuned to 
PDLQVWUHDP)UHQFKRSLQLRQ¶>(@YHQWVKDYHVSRNHQ$QGWKHDYHUDJH
Frenchman has clearly understood that the policy of concession has pitifully 
failed and that it is QHFHVVDU\WRILQGDQRWKHUSROLF\·80 To sustain a firm 
foreign policy, France required domestic unity, discipline and resolve. As the 
0LQLVWHURI)LQDQFH3DXO5H\QDXGWROGWKH)UHQFKSHRSOHRQ-XO\¶,WLV
essential that the spirit of defeatism should GLVDSSHDU«WKDWWKH)UHQFK
people should not abandon the spirit of sacrifice, cease to believe in France, 
RURQFHDJDLQIDOOEDFNRQIDFLOHLGHDV·81 5H\QDXG·VFRPPHQWVVXJJHVWWKDW
the French elites remained concerned by certain residual representations of 
French opinion, and his allusion to defeatism was doubtless inspired by 
'pDW·V¶0RXULUSRXU'DQW]LJ"·DUWLFOH(YLGHQWO\WKHUHVLGXDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
of pacifism ² which even at the time was equated with defeatism - had yet to 
completely dissipate.  
This was amply reflected during the final days of peace. As Jean-
Baptiste Duroselle has noted, the French Cabinet was divided between the 
¶UHVLVWHUV·DQGWKH¶SDFLILVWV·82 Beyond the Cabinet, several other influential 
figures were also reluctant to maintain the Polish commitment, including 
Jean Mistler, the President of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the French 
                                                 
79 APP, BA/1815: Tract published by the Étudiants anti-juifs, from a police report of 3 June 
1939; APP, BA/1692: Police report, 14 June 1939, of a PHHWLQJRUJDQL]HGE\O·8QLRQGHV
Amicales Socialistes du XIème arrondissement, on 13 June. 
80 APP, BA/2011: Police report of a tract distributed by de Kérillis, 23 June 1939. 
81 Radio broadcast by Paul Reynaud, 29 July 1939, cited in a report on events in France 
during the third quarter of 1939, sent to Halifax by Campbell, 2 November 1939 (TNA, FO 
371/22910/C17813/25/17). 
82 Duroselle, La décadence, p. 475. 
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Chamber, and his counterpart in the Senate, Henry Bérenger. Bonnet, 
however, remained WKHPRVWLQIOXHQWLDO¶SDFLILVW·DQGRQ6HSWHPEHUKH
urged tKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWWRVKDUHKLVFRQYLFWLRQWKDW¶XQWLOWKHODVW
PRPHQWQRHIIRUWEHQHJOHFWHGLQDWWHPSWLQJWRUHVWRUHWKHSHDFH·83 
Similarly, die-KDUGDGYRFDWHVRI¶QHR-SDFLILVP·VXFKDV)ODQGLQSOHDGHGWKDW
SHDFH¶LVVWLOOSRVVLEOH·84  
Of course, French leaders were aware that French opinion was not 
enthused by the prospect of war. On 26 August, Daladier addressed a 
personal message to the German Chancellor, as one war veteran to another, 
re-iterating French determination to uphold her pledges to Poland, although 
expressing the hope that a peaceful solution to the Danzig imbroglio could 
be found. Daladier once more reflected a general war anxiety in prophesizing 
WKHUHSHUFXVVLRQVRIDFRQIOLFW¶,I)UHQFKDQG*HUPDQEORRGLVVSLOWDJDLQ« 
in a longer and bloodier war, then both will fight confident of their own 
victory. But what is most certain is that devastation and barbarism will be 
the victor·85 Moreover, in his radio broadcast to the French people on 3 
September, Daladier stressed that France, a peaceful nation, was only going 
WRZDU¶EHFDXVHLWKDVEHHQLPSRVHGRQXV·86 This interpretation was echoed 
WKURXJKRXWWKH)UHQFKSUHVV¶:DUKDVEHHQLPSRVHGRQ)UDQFHDQGVKHKDV
QRFKRLFHEXWWRILJKW·ZDVWKHYHUGLFWRIO·Intransigeant.87 Similarly, Blum 
DUJXHGWKDW¶WKH1D]LVKDYHFRPSHOOHGWKHPRVWSHDFHIXORIQDWLRQVWRJRWR
ZDUIRUWKHGHIHQFHRIKHUOLEHUW\H[LVWHQFHDQGKRQRXU·88  
 
For the French government, reactive representations of opinion since 
Munich indicated that the majority of the French population was morally 
prepared for war.89 Although war was certainly not desired, it was accepted, 
and the lingering anxieties regarding the prospect of war did not equate to a 
                                                 
83 AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/14, 2 DA 7 Dr. 6 sdra: Georges Bonnet to Charles Corbin (by 
telephone), 1 September 1939. 
84 Paris-Soir, 29 August 1939. 
85 )RQGV*HQHEULHU*('DODGLHU·VOHWWHUWR+LWOHU$XJXVW 
86 Speech by Daladier, broadcast by radio on the evening of 3 September 1939, cited in 
°XYUH, 4 September 1939. 
87 Intransigeant, 2 September 1939. 
88 Le Populaire, 4 September 1939. 
89 This conclusion thus confirms that of Crémieux-Brilhac, /HV)UDQoDLVGHO·$Q. 
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visceral pacifism that made a French defeat inevitable.90 If war remained, as 
7DOERW,POD\KDVVXJJHVWHG¶DQXQDFFHSWDEOHSURVSHFWIRUODUJHVHFWLRQVRI
WKH)UHQFKSROLWLFDOVSHFWUXP·HOLWHSHUFHSWLRQVRISXEOLFRSLQLRQSHUVXDGHG
them that war had been reluctantly accepted.91 In sum, reactive 
representations of French opinion no longer perpetuated the residual 
representation of widespread pacifism. Therefore, the situation in September 
1939 was very different from the situation just one year earlier. At the time 
of Munich, numerous vocal reactive representations, emanating from the 
WUDGLWLRQDOSDFLILVWVRIWKHSROLWLFDOOHIWWRWKH¶QHR-SDFLILVP·RIWKHIDUULJKW
continued to reinforce the perception of a pacifist French public hostile to 
going to war. After Munich, these reactive representations increasingly 
yielded to demands for a firmer foreign policy. 
The fact that these representations yielded so rapidly suggests that 
they were never an accurate barometer of wider French opinion; they were 
simply more voluble, creating the impression that pacifism was more 
widespread than was actually the case. Of course, pacifist doctrine appealed 
to many French men and women, as no-one desired war. But this desire to 
avoid war can be better defined as war anxiety. Indeed, in the post-Munich 
period, reactive representations of opinion suggested that the only way to 
avoid war was to deter Germany through French strength and resolve. In 
essence, therefore, war anxiety is compatible with a determination to fight. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this article to trace the evolution of opinion 
during the drôle de guerre ² a subject worthy of a study in its own right ² it 
can be concluded that French opinion at the start of the Second World War 
was certainly not riddled with pacifism and defeatism. Consequently, the 
conditions for the defeat of 1940 - and subsequently for Vichy - were far 
from established. 
                                                 
90 Robert Frank has argued that, although the Daladier government enjoyed some 
successes in preparing France for war, it was never able to overcome the widespread 
pacifism that continued to haunt France even after the outbreak of war. La hantise du 
decline: la France, 1920-1960: finances, défense et identité nationale, (Paris, 1994). The 
notion of the fall of the Third Republic being inevitable is a recurring theme in much French 
historiography, notably the decadence school. Notably, see Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique 
de 1919 à nos jours (Paris, 1981), and idem, La décadence. 
91 T. Imlay, Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics, and Economics in Britain and 
France, 1938-1940, (Oxford, 2003), p. 358. 
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